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AN ECONOMIC AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO
VIEWS OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY
By, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt is a Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law at Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. Professor Dau-Schmidt is a nationally recognized teacher and scholar on
the subjects of labor and employment law and the economic analysis of legal problems.
Professor Dau-Schmidt is author of seven books and numerous articles on labor and employment law
and the economic analysis of law, and he frequently presents papers at academic conferences and law
schools across the United States, Canada, Europe and Asia. In 1990 he received the Scholarly Paper
Award from the Association of American Law Schools for his work on the economic analysis of the
criminal law as a preference-shaping policy. Professor Dau-Schmidt is active in law school
administration, most recently serving as Associate Dean of Faculty Research. Involved in several
national academic associations, Professor Dau-Schmidt was elected to the National Council of the
American Association of University Professors and appointed to serve on the executive and litigation
committees of that organization.
Professor Dau-Schmidt has been invited to teach at various European and Asian universities, including
Christian-Albrechts-Universität in Kiel, Germany; Friedrich-Alexander-Universität in Erlangen,
Germany; and Universität Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) in Paris.
Professor Dau-Schmidt holds a Ph.D. in economics, J.D. and M.A. in economics from the University of
Michigan, and a B.A. in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin.

I. INTRODUCTION
There are two divergent views on the role of public sector collective bargaining in
American law. The first is that public sector collective bargaining undermines
democratic government, allowing organized employees to interfere with the
administration of the law for their own personal benefit at the expense of the
general population and taxpayer.[1] Under this view, courts have characterized
public sector collective bargaining as an unconstitutional interference with
freedom of contract or an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.[2] In
legislative and policy debates the detractors argue that unions are merely “labor
cartels” that are both inefficient and inequitable, raising wages and benefits at the
expense of consumers and taxpayers and imposing inefficient and inflexible work
rules.[3]
The second view is that public sector collective bargaining is an essential part of
democratic government. Under this view, collective bargaining is a fundamental
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human right[4] included in our cherished constitutional rights of free speech and
association,[5] and an essential counterbalance to corporate interests in a
pluralistic society.[6] Supporters would argue that, on the whole, public sector
collective bargaining improves democratic outcomes and government
administration by giving workers a voice in the outcome[7] which improves the
provision of government services and the administration of the law.[8] Public
sector unions represent important public policy interests in collective bargaining
and legislative lobbying and act as a check on government monopsony power in
employment.[9] Moreover, unions, in both the private and the public sectors,
foster a healthy middle class, promote greater equality in the distribution of
income, and promote the representation of the views of workers in legislative
debates.[10]
Many of the broader claims of these two views are subject to empirical
analysis. One of the points of public sector unions is to raise employee wages and
benefits over what they would have been in the absence of a union; but are they
raised above comparable levels in the private sector at the expense of taxpayers, or
do they promote comparable wages that attract good public servants and long-run
administrative interests rather than short-term budget cutting interests? Do
public sector unions impose work rules and restrictions that interfere with the
provision of government services, or do they provide an employee voice that
improves government services and the administration of the law? In this essay, I
will present an outline of the economic arguments both for and against public
sector unions, and the empirical evidence supporting or refuting those
arguments. My intent is to provide an empirical context for the larger debate
regarding public policy with respect to public sector collective bargaining and the
larger constitutional debate over this institution.
II. PRIMER ON THE STATE AS AN ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL
EMPLOYER: DIFFERENT IS GOOD, AND EXPECTED!
Regardless of whether public employees are organized or not, economic theory
suggests that there should be some predictable differences between the terms and
conditions of employment between the typical public sector employee and the
typical private sector employee, given the requirements of most government jobs
and various characteristics of the government as an employer.
First, there are important demographic differences between public and private
employees that have to be taken into account in accurately comparing their relative
compensation. As shown in Table 1, on average, public employees have more years
of education, more years of experience (age), work fewer hours and are more likely
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to be female or Black (but not Hispanic) than private sector employees. It is vital
to take account of the educational differences between public and private sector
workers in comparing their wages and benefits. Many government jobs require a
bachelor’s degree or an advanced or professional degree in order to competently
do the job.[11] As a result, while only 25 to 30 percent of private sector employees
have at least a bachelor’s degree, over half of public employees have at least a
bachelor’s degree.[12] In order to recruit educated people into public sector jobs,
these employees have to be compensated for their investment in
education,[13] and thus one would expect that, because government workers are
more educated, on average, than private sector employees, they should be paid
more, on average, than private sector employees.[14] Similarly, one should also
take account of the fact that, on average, public employees work fewer hours and
currently have more years of work experience than private sector
employees. Finally, although theoretically there should be no difference in
compensation based on gender, race or ethnicity, historically women and minority
groups have done better in public employment. It is at least interesting to control
for systematic differences between private and public compensation based on
these factors, although in this case lower wages in the private sector may be an
indicia of discrimination based on gender or race.
TABLE 1: Characteristics of Private, State and Local Employees (2008 and 2009)
Private
103.2

Number (Millions)
Education (%)
Less Than HS
8.5
High School
31.1
Some College
30.6
College Degree
20.9
Adv Degree
8.9
Annual
Hours
Worked*
2197
Median Age (Years) 40
Women (%)
46.2
Black (%)**
9.6
Hispanic (%)**
17.1

State
6.0

Local
10.7

State & Local
16.7

1.9
17.9
27.1
27.5
25.6

2.8
21.1
26.5
27.4
22.3

2.5
19.9
26.7
27.4
23.5

—
43
59.1
13.4
8.3

—
44
60.8
11.5
10.8

2156
44
60.2
12.2 (est)
9.8 (est)
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Sources: John Schmitt, The Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees, Center
for Policy Research, 3, tbl. 1 (May 2010) (Analysis of CEPR extract (version 1.5) of 2009 CPS
ORG; *Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Overcompensated Public Employee,
Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #276, at 10, tbl. 5 (Sept 15, 2010) (analysis of 2009
CPS data for private and public employees); ** Keith A. Bender & John S. Heywood, Out of
Balance? Comparing Public and Private Sector Compensation over 20 Years, Ctr. for State &
Local Gov’t Excellence, Nat’l Inst. on Ret. Sec. 7, tbl. 1 (Apr. 2010) (2008 CPS data).

Second, the state is a relatively large employer, and large employers are good at
bearing risk because they have a large number of employees over which risk can be
pooled and they enjoy economies of scale in the coverage of risk.[15] As a result,
large employers can more efficiently offer benefits such as health insurance and
pensions that insulate employees from risk, and it is predictable that benefits
would constitute a larger percent of the employees’ compensation package for large
employers like the state.[16] Because of its relative insulation from market
fluctuations and its high degree of credit-worthiness, the state is a particularly
good risk-bearer, even among large employers. Thus it is predictable that, even in
comparison with other large employers, the state would offer to bear or insure
employee risk through the provision of various benefits in exchange for relatively
lower wages. Accordingly, one would expect that the typical public employee
compensation package would include a higher percentage of compensation in
benefits such as healthcare and pensions, and a lower percent in up front wages,
in comparison with the compensation packages of typical private employees.[17]
Third, the demand for government services is more predictable than the demand
for most private businesses and thus, as an employer, the state probably does not
place as high a premium on having flexibility to lay off employees as do private
businesses. A rational state would want to maintain public employment in hard
economic times as a counter-cyclical check against recession.[18] Indeed, the
demand for many government services increases in hard economic times so a state
might actually want to employ more workers rather than fewer when the economy
goes bad. As a result, one would expect that, rationally, the state would want to
offer job stability to employees in exchange for lower wages, and one would expect
that state employees would enjoy greater job security than comparable private
sector employees.[19] Indeed, historically, the necessity of protecting valuable
state employees and their positions from political cronyism or patronage has
required strict protection under civil service laws.[20]
Thus, even in a competitive labor market, without unions or political advocacy, one
would expect that public employee compensation, including the value of both
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wages and benefits, would on average be higher than that for all private employees
(because of the greater average educational requirements of public employment
jobs), but that the compensation package for public employees would include
relatively lower wages and higher benefits, including job security, than that for
private sector employees. Simple analyses that assume that any difference
between the compensation packages of public and private employees in either
amount or wage and benefit mix is a sign of government waste and inefficiency and
political favoritism are simply wrong.[21]
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE TWO VIEWS OF UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ECONOMICS
A.

Public Employee Unions as Labor Cartels and Special Interest Groups

The simple economic analysis of unions, in either the private or public sector, is
that they are labor cartels that impose on employers wage demands and other
terms and conditions of employment that are both inefficient and
inequitable.[22] Under the simple neo-classical analysis, such labor cartels cause
inefficient production and consumption, unemployment and a displacement of
workers from organized work to unorganized work, depressing wages there. They
are also inequitable because employee wage increases come at the expense of
consumers or taxpayers who are not necessarily any wealthier than public
employees.
This simple analysis is presented in Figure 1. Figure 1(a) represents the organized
labor market where the vertical axis measures the employees’ wages, the horizontal
axis measures the number of full-time employees employed, the solid downward
sloping curve labeled D represents the employers’ labor demand curve, and the
solid upward sloping curve labeled S represents the employees’ labor supply
curve. Figure 1(b) represents the unorganized labor market, with analogous
demand and supply curves. Prior to the entry of the union, both the organized and
the unorganized markets are in equilibrium with a competitive wage Wc, a
competitive level of employment Nc, and supply equals demand (S =
D).[23] Under the traditional analysis, when the union organizes a sufficient
number of employees in the relevant product market, it imposes a monopoly wage
on the employers in the organized market Wu. Barriers to entry prevent the
organized employers from replacing the employees,[24] and the employer
responds by moving up his demand curve, reducing employment from Nc to Nu.
The employer accomplishes this decrease in employment by reducing production
and substituting capital for labor in the production process, resulting in
“production inefficiency.”[25] The higher union wage also results in
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unemployment because more workers (Ns) would like to work at the union wage
than the employers are willing to employ (Nu). As shown in Figure 1, some of these
workers (Nc – Nu) seek employment in the unorganized labor market shown in
Figure 1(b), pushing out the labor supply curve in that market from S to S′ and
depressing wages from Wc to W′c.[26] Moreover, the decrease in production by
the organized firms and the increase in the organized employees’ wage results in
an increase in the product price to the consumer or taxpayer. This results in
“consumption inefficiency” because the consumers or taxpayers will now buy too
little of the good relative to other goods.[27]
Finally, critics argue that public sector unions use political pressure to maintain
the product market monopoly and pressure public employers to accede to union
demands. Drawing on public choice theory, they argue that public employees are
a narrow interest group that can gain personal benefits at the expense of the larger
electorate.[28]
FIGURE: The Simple Neoclassical Model of Unions and Collective Bargaining

Based on the above analysis, conservatives argue that public employee unions
impose wages and benefits that are higher than those enjoyed by comparable
private sector employees who are not organized. These higher wages and benefits
raise the cost of government services and cause inefficient production and
consumption. These higher wages and benefits are also inequitable because they
come at the expense of taxpayers who may not be as wealthy as the public
employees. Moreover, public employee collective bargaining undermines our
democratic government by establishing a special interest group with an interest in
gaining wages and benefits at the expense of ordinary taxpayers. These special
interest groups undermine the working of our democratic government because
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they have a concentrated interest in rent-seeking at the expense of the larger
electorate’s interest in the efficient provision of government services. As a solution
to these problems conservatives have argued that we should prohibit collective
bargaining in the public sector (and in the private sector too).[29]
Even before we get to the empirical question of whether public sector employees,
and in particular organized public employees, are over-paid, there are some logical
objections that can be raised to the conservative account. It seems a gross
exaggeration to say that public sector unions in the United States establish a labor
cartel that dictates wage and benefit increases. Even before the recent round of
state statutes limiting or doing away with collective bargaining rights, only thirtyfour states had comprehensive public sector collective bargaining laws, and only
eight had statutes allowing any public employees even a limited right to
strike.[30] There is no right to strike among federal employees,[31] and strikes in
violation of this stricture have met with wholesale termination of the striking
federal employees.[32] For the vast majority of American public sector employees,
if there is any right to collectively bargain, it is more a right to consultation with a
possible resort to neutral fact-finding or arbitration on disputed topics. The
primary benefits to American public employees from collective bargaining are their
association with other employees with similar interests, a First Amendment right,
and the opportunity to have signed contracts on their terms and conditions of
employment that are enforceable for a period of time, generally two to four years—
most often two.
B.

Employee Voice at Work and in Government

The neoclassical analysis of unions as labor cartels is logically incomplete and far
too simple for such a complex phenomenon. The basic neoclassical analysis
ignores the benefits of efficient negotiations between the union and the employer
and the possibility of employer monopsony power. It would be irrational for the
union to dictate wages while the employer sets employment; instead, the parties
should rationally bargain over both wages and employment to reach Pareto
optimal agreements.[33] In the case of employer monopsony power, collective
bargaining can move the parties to a more efficient level of wages and
employment. Moreover, it has been persuasively argued that collective bargaining
can raise efficiency by providing a role for employee voice in the production
process and the negotiation and enforcement of contract terms.[34] Employees,
especially skilled professional employees like many public employees, can provide
useful input into the production process and act as useful monitors of management
performance in the workplace. Unions can also be useful in negotiating efficient
contract terms over public goods in the workplace and the enforcement of efficient
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deals between the employees and the employer over time. Finally, public employee
unions can be useful in the political process, representing the benefits of the
programs in which they work and the under-represented perspective of working
Americans in general. As a result, far from simply being an exercise in rentseeking, the participation of public sector unions in the political process makes an
important contribution to pluralism in our democracy.[35]
Pareto Optimal Bargaining

Unless one wants to assume that unions are entirely indifferent to the
unemployment of their members, the simple depiction of collective bargaining in
the neoclassical model in which the union sets the wage and the employer responds
by setting employment will not be Pareto optimal for the parties. Although the
employer’s labor demand curve gives the profit maximizing response to a market
increase in wages, if the wage increase results from the formation of a union that
can bargain over both wages and employment, the employer and union can
negotiate a wage and employment agreement that specifies a higher level of
employment and a lower wage that both the employer and union will prefer to the
employer’s labor demand response.[36] Indeed, if one assumes that the parties
bargain to maximize the monetary value of rents and productivity increases due to
unionization, one can demonstrate that the parties will seek to minimize the
impact of the union on product price and firm employment levels.[37]
Employer Monopsony Power

Moreover, if the employer enjoys monopsony power in the labor market, it can be
shown that the formation of a union can actually move the employer to a more
efficient wage and level of employment through collective bargaining.[38] An
employer exercises monopsony power when it employs such a significant share of
the labor in the relevant labor market that it realizes that its wage policies affect
the market wage.[39] When an employer monopsony exists, the employer no
longer has to accept the market wage as given, but instead realizes that it can drive
down the market wage by employing fewer employees. As characterized in Figure
2, which shows the relevant labor supply curve (S) and the employer’s labor
demand curve (D) and marginal cost of labor curve (MCL), the monopsonistic
employer maximizes profits by employing fewer employees (Lm) and driving the
wage down from Wc to Wm.[40] The actions of the monopsonist in decreasing
employment and wages results in production inefficiency because the monopsonist
employs less than the efficient amount of labor in the production process. A union
can solve this problem because, by fixing the wage for labor at a given rate, it
prevents the monopsonist from driving down wages by employing fewer workers.
Because the monopsonist can no longer drive down the wage by cutting
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employment, the monopsonist no longer has incentive to employ fewer than the
efficient number of employees.[41] The problem of the negotiation of a wage
between a monopsony employer and a monopoly union represents an
indeterminate bargaining problem, but if one assumes the employer and the union
seek to maximize the monetary value of the rents from their endeavors, they will
bargain to the competitive wage (Wc) and the competitive level of employment
(Lc).[42] Thus, when facing employer monopsony power, monopoly unions can
increase employment and economic efficiency.
FIGURE 2: A Monopsonistic Labor Market

Productivity Enhancing Effects of Unions

There are also a variety of economic theories under which unions and collective
bargaining can increase the productivity of the employees and the efficiency of
their terms and conditions of employment.[43] First, unions can allow employees
to make useful contributions in organizing the production process and monitoring
the work of administrators and managers.[44] Employees have an obvious interest
in the success of their employer and the productivity of their work. Moreover,
employees, and in particular skilled or educated employees, have important
knowledge of the production process that is useful in planning production to make
the enterprise more successful.[45] Discussions with collective representatives in
a union setting are more likely to be productive than individual discussions
because employees will have less fear of retaliation for reporting administrative
failures.
Second, unions help to promote the negotiation of efficient contract terms. Many
terms and conditions of employment are public goods in that they are the same for
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all employees and an individual employee cannot negotiate improvements without
benefiting others. Examples include: common hours of work, the common method
of evaluation, and the general form of medical or pension benefits.[46] Because
improvements in these public goods are not exclusive, individual employees have
too little incentive to negotiate for them, resulting in a contract for employment
that includes too little of these benefits. Unions help to solve this problem by
giving the workers a collective voice through which they can more accurately
represent their preferences on such matters.[47] There are also terms and
conditions of employment for which there are important information costs and
asymmetries, for example, health risks on the job and the expected value of health
and pension benefits. Individually, it is very costly for employees to collect all of
the information necessary to negotiate efficient terms with respect to these
conditions of employment.[48] Unions help solve this problem by hiring experts
and taking advantage of economies of scale in collecting and maintain the
necessary information.[49]
Third, unions help promote the efficient enforcement of express or implicit
contracts. It is often efficient for the employer and employees to make agreements
that are enforceable over considerable periods of time, for example health and
pension benefits. Moreover, in both the private and the public sectors, it is
common for employers to pay employees less than their marginal product early in
their careers and more than their marginal product later in their careers.[50] This
deferred compensation serves important purposes of compensating employees for
investments in human capital and minimizing employer monitoring
costs.[51] Unfortunately, such deferred compensation creates incentives for
employers to act opportunistically and fire employees before they receive their
deferred wages. Agreements to defer a portion of compensation often remain
implicit because of the costs of negotiation and enforcement.[52] However, they
can also be enforced by express terms that discourage the discharge of employees
later in their careers, for example, seniority agreements and just cause
clauses. Unions facilitate the enforcement of such long-term implicit contracts by
protecting employees from employers’ opportunistic behavior with collective
action, seniority rules, just-cause provisions, and arbitration provisions.[53]
Finally, some argue that unions raise productivity by promoting the adjustment of
working conditions through the efficient expression of a collective voice rather
than costly exit.[54] In a competitive labor market, a worker’s primary mechanism
for expressing dissatisfaction with working conditions is to take another job or
“exit” the firm. Individual bargaining over conditions of employment is difficult
due to the free-rider effect previously discussed and because workers do not want
to be identified by their employer as “troublemakers.” However, exit is an
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inefficient mechanism by which to encourage changes in working condition
because it does not communicate what was wrong with the job and because it
imposes search and retraining costs on both the employee and the employer.
Unions help solve this problem by giving workers a collective voice through which
they can express dissatisfaction with working conditions without the problems of
free riding or employer retaliation. Besides being a more effective method of
expressing dissatisfaction with working conditions, the collective voice also saves
money by reducing the number of workers who leave jobs and, thus, the amount
of search and retraining costs.
Unions as an Important Part of a Pluralist Democracy

Last but not least, many have argued that free labor unions are an important part
of democratic pluralism. Not only do free people, including public sector
employees, have the right to organize to petition the government, in a society
where the interests of capital are so well organized and financed, it is imperative
that workers organize to represent their interests in the legislature. The services
provided by public employees are in direct competition for public dollars with
alternative state purchases and tax breaks for special interests and the public atlarge.[55] These competing interests are well organized and funded in their
lobbying efforts, including advocates for lower taxes and smaller government in
general.[56] To attempt to silence public employees or hinder their collective
public representation[57] will bias future debate over the merits of the services
public employees provide.
The fact that public employees have particular interests as employees of the state
should not disqualify them from collective redress to the government, unless we
are also willing to disqualify the other lobbyists with direct interests—almost every
single lobbyist in Washington and our state capitals. Indeed, it is probably
important that public employees address their particular interests before the
government because they have direct experience with the benefits their services
provide to society and special expertise and experience on how those services can
best be provided and efficiently administered. The fact that these employees also
have a personal interest in higher wages and benefits is completely transparent and
the compensation they receive is a matter of public record and easily accounted for
in the public debate.
Finally, public employees also share interests with private sector employees in the
general organization of the employment relationship, and society, and these
interests require representation before the government. To disadvantage public
employees in the political debate is to further disadvantage worker interests

14

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

FALL 2012

relative to the interests of management and capital in the formulation of our laws
and government policies. Even outside of the legislative process, it is important to
have employee organization for the efficient evolution of legal rules and social
norms. Organized groups have “repeat player” advantages and can better litigate
and lobby to establish precedents and social norms.[58] Employers are certainly
organized to represent their interests in the legislature and courts, including the
court of public opinion, and unless employee interests are similarly organized in
unions, laws, precedents and social norms will evolve in favor of employer interests
and against employee interests.[59]
The Positive View of Public Sector Unions and Collective Bargaining

Based on the analysis of unions as a collective voice, progressives argue that public
employee unions are important in ensuring adequate compensation for public
employees, an adequate level of funding for government services, the efficient
provision and administration of government services and a voice for employee
concerns in the legislative process. Thus they would predict that, although
organization would increase public employee wages and benefits, that
compensation would be commensurate to the compensation enjoyed by
comparable private sector employees, although a larger portion might be received
in the form of benefits to take advantage of the government’s advantages as an
insurer. They would also predict that states with public employee organization
would have better funded and administered systems for the provision of
government services. Finally, they would argue that the legislative activities of
public employee unions help balance the lobbying activities of other groups
providing a more balanced perspective on the costs and benefits of government
programs and providing particular expertise, all of which would tend to improve
the outcomes of the legislative process.
Even in an ad hoc analysis, there would seem to be some force behind these
arguments. First, the government would seem to enjoy monopsony power over a
broad array of public employees. Empirical work supports the notion that the
government enjoys monopsony power over school teachers and pricing power with
respect to other professionals it commonly employs.[60] If this is the case, the
cost-minimizing strategy for the state in providing public services would be to
choke back employment and wages. Even where the government does not enjoy
monopsony power in a labor market, it may acquire the ability to act
opportunistically with respect to its employees. Any public employee who invests
a significant portion of his or her career in acquiring human capital specific to the
workings of that state would seem vulnerable to later opportunistic behavior by the
employer. No other employer will reward the public employee for that investment.
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In light of this economic power over its employees, the political nature of the state
takes on a different light. State government can be used as a means for taxpayers
or consumers and special interests to take advantage of public employees for shortterm gain by reneging on promises that have to be enforced over time. For the
efficient enforcement of long-term agreements with the state it is essential that
such agreements cannot be undone with every change in political power.
IV.
A.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Wages and Benefits

There have been a number of recent empirical studies comparing wages and
benefits in the private and public sector. These studies take two different strategies
to account for the differences between private and public employees in education
and other demographic factors. One strategy is to compare “similar people” by
comparing employees with similar educational levels and other demographic
factors through comparing means for select populations or through regression
analysis.[61] Alternatively, an analyst might compare “similar positions” by
comparing what people get paid in the private and public sector for doing the same
job.[62] The first strategy is far more common because there are many occupations
that are not well represented in both the private and public sectors and regression
analysis allows a fairly sophisticated accounting of compensation differences
between private and public employees.[63] Fortunately, the two methods yield
similar results.[64]
Historically, the concern among economists and policy analysts has been whether
public pay was too low rather than too high. In evaluating the early empirical
evidence, Richard Kearney concluded that “[u]ntil the rise of [public sector] unions
. . . in the 1960s and 1970s, public employees were consistently underpaid relative
to similar workers in the private sector.”[65] With the advent of significant public
employee representation in the 1970’s, economists became very interested in the
comparability of private and public wages and benefits and began trying to
compare the wages and benefits of workers in similar public and private sector
jobs.[66] The results of studies using this methodology varied, depending on the
sample used and the examined worker characteristics. Dale Belman and John
Heywood examined variation between private and public employees across seven
states using Current Population Survey data and found that local government
employees earned less than comparable private sector workers in six of the states
and state employees earned less than comparable private sector workers in three
of the states.[67] George Borjas analyzed private and public sector earnings from
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the 1960s to 2000 and found that public sector employees suffered lower pay than
comparable private sector employees; In 2000, men earned about 6 percent less
in the public sector and women earned about the same in the public sector as the
private sector when adjusted for demographic characteristics.[68] In a particularly
detailed analysis of different worker characteristics, Sang-Hyop Lee used National
Longitudinal Survey data to find that female state employees earned 4 percent less
than comparable private employees and male state employees earned 9 percent
less than comparable private employees.[69] Greg Lewis and Chester Galloway
used detailed census data to examine pay differentials in all fifty states and found
that both state and local employees were paid less than private employees in 44
states.[70] They tentatively concluded that “most [state and local governments]
pay less than private firms in the same state for similar workers.”[71] Finally, in
perhaps the most complete study comparing pay between occupations in the
private and public sectors, Michael Miller found that private industry paid better
for virtually all professional and administrative jobs, but that for technical and
clerical job levels and blue-collar workers the findings were mixed.[72] Miller’s
results suggest that at higher skill levels private employees enjoy higher pay, but
that at low skill levels public employees enjoy higher pay.
Perhaps the best of the most recent studies on the subject was conducted by Jeffrey
Keefe.[73] Keefe used Current Population Survey data (wages) and Employer Costs
of Employee Compensation data (benefits) for the year 2009 to compare private
and public employee compensation across educational levels and size of firm while
controlling for a variety of worker characteristics including hours worked,
education, experience, organizational size, gender, race and disability. He found
that public employees are paid wages that are 11.47 percent less than those paid
comparable private sector employees.[74] Public employees do indeed enjoy
benefits that are a larger share of total compensation (34.1 percent) than the
average private sector employer, but only marginally larger than private employees
with 500 employees or more (33.1 percent).[75] After accounting for public
employees’ better benefits, Keefe found that they still were paid total compensation
packages on average worth 3.74 percent less than comparable private sector
employees.[76] Keefe found that the difference between private and public sector
compensation varied according to the employee’s level of education with public
employees with just a high school education or “some college” earning more than
their private sector counterparts while public employees with a bachelor’s degree
or an advanced degree earning considerable less.[77]
Keith Bender and John Heywood have recently confirmed Keefe’s general findings
on a national basis by examining data from several individual states over a period
encompassing almost last three decades.[78] Using Current Population Survey
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data from the years 1983 to 2008, Bender and Heywood found that the
public/private wage differential for state employees nationally was about -6% in
1983, closed to a little more than -1% in the early 1990’s, but has since expanded
to a little more than -11% in the 2000s.[79] The public/private wage differential
for local employees showed a similar pattern of first narrowing and then widening;
however local government employees were consistently paid even less than state
employees. Bender and Heywood examined CPS on an individual state basis for
the states of California, Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and
Florida, and found similar patterns, although for some states the public/private
wage differential was sometimes positive indicating that the public employees were
then paid slightly more than their private sector counterparts.[80] The states
where public employees fared better over the examined period than the national
public/private wage differential of -11.4 percent were Pennsylvania (-4.5 percent),
Florida (-4.8 percent), New York (-7.0 percent), California (-9.8 percent) and
Michigan (-10.1 percent). In Illinois (-12.5 percent) and Texas (-16.6 percent), they
fared worse than the national average.[81]
Keefe has also done studies using Current Population Survey data and Employer
Costs for Employee Compensation data to compare public and private wages and
benefits in particular states for the year 2009. After controlling for education,
hours worked, experience, organizational size, gender, race and disability, Keefe
found that New Jersey public employees received 2.25 percent less in wages and
2.43 percent more in total compensation than comparable private sector
employees in that state, with neither figure being statistically
significant;[82] California public employees received a statistically significant 6.36
percent less in wages and a statistically insignificant 2.29 percent more in total
compensation than comparable private sector employees in that state,[83] and
Wisconsin public employees received 4.8 percent less in total compensation than
comparable private sector employees in that state.[84]
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GRAPH 1

Based on the above analyses it seems safe to say that, although union density is
much greater in the public sector than in the private sector in the American
economy,[85] public employee unions have not raised the average total
compensation for public employees to a position of parity with the average total
compensation of comparable private sector employees. But what has been the
impact of public sector unions on their members’ wages and benefits in
comparison with organized private employees and unorganized private
employees? Although there is not as much recent empirical work on these
questions as there is on the public/private pay differential,[86] the work that does
exist seems to suggest that public sector unions raise both their members’ wages
and benefits by a modest amount, but not by as much as private sector unions raise
their members’ wages and benefits.[87] Also like their private sector counterparts,
public sector unions tend to have a leveling impact on wages, reducing income
disparities between men and women and majority workers and minority workers,
and also reducing differences between high and low paid employees.[88]
Studies have been done on the impact of collective bargaining on particular types
of public employees, and public employees in general. Much attention has been
paid to the impact of collective bargaining on K-12 teachers’ salaries and benefits
because teachers are a high percent of government employees and often in the
public eye. The available studies seem to indicate that the mean wage effect of
teachers’ unions was about 5 percent in the 1960s and about 7 percent in the 1970s
– 1990s.[89] Despite this, teachers’ salaries barely kept pace with inflation and
rose less than other full-time employees during the boom years of the
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1990s.[90] Less work exists on Police and Firefighters, but the work that does exist
suggests that organized police enjoy a salary advantage of 4 percent to 8 percent,
which peaked about 1977 and has declined since then.[91] With respect to state
employees, early work shows a combined wage and benefits advantage for union
workers of 4 percent,[92] while more recent work places the advantage at about 7
percent.[93] After surveying the relevant work, Richard Kearney concluded that,
although the union advantage in the public sector has varied over time and among
occupations and geographic regions, but “[t]he best estimate of the overall union
effect [in the public sector] is probably 5 to 6 percent.”[94] This is well less than
the usual 10-15 percent compensation advantage attributed to unions in the private
sector.[95] Given these findings, it seems that, on average, the most that one could
reasonably expect of collective bargaining in the public sector is that it would help
public employees reach a rough parity in compensation with private sector
employees.
B.

Productivity

As previously discussed there are divergent views on the impact of unions on the
productivity of public employees and the efficiency of the agencies which employ
their members. Detractors argue that unions impose high wages causing inefficient
production and consumption.[96] They also argue that unions impose inefficient
work rules and interfere with management’s flexibility in determining how to
undertake production.[97] Supporters of collective bargaining argue that higher
wages attract superior workers and decrease turnover costs, increasing
productivity. Moreover they argue that public sector unions sometimes counter
employer monopsony power and can raise efficiency by raising wages and
employment closer to efficient levels.[98] Supporters also argue that unions
provide employees with a collective voice so that they can act as an effective
monitor of management, make positive contributions to improving productivity,
negotiate and enforce efficient contract terms and further reduce
turnover.[99] These arguments would seem particularly true where the employees
are professional employees well trained in the conduct of their craft, for example
teachers. Much less empirical work has been done on these questions, but there
are some relevant empirical findings to discuss.
The primary argument that unions promote inefficiency is that unions raise wages
to inefficient levels, thus causing inefficient production and consumption. Since
public sector unions typically achieve only a rough parity with comparable private
sector workers in the total compensation their members receive, it would seem that
there is little, if any, inefficiency caused by public sector union wages. Indeed,
Richard Kearney has observed that, at least among teachers, public sector unions
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have been more concerned with maintaining or increasing employment than
increasing wages.[100] This behavior seems more consistent with the argument of
proponents of collective bargaining that public sector unions bargain with a
monopsonist employer and can increase efficiency by increasing both wages and
employment.[101] Increasing the number of teachers lowers the student teacher
ratio, a primary determinant of the effectiveness of our schools.[102] Detractors
might argue that our schools employ too many teachers, and unions make this
problem worse, but this argument is both increasingly difficult to make, and I have
yet to see it cogently articulated. Thus, by trying to maintain or increase teacher
employment it would seem that teachers’ unions seek to improve school efficiency.
On the question of whether public sector unions impose inefficient work rules, the
current debate has been replete with numerous anecdotes but very short on hard
empirical evidence.[103] Detractors of collective bargaining have argued that
unions decrease efficiency: by negotiating seniority and just cause provisions
which limit the employer’s discretion in discharging or laying off employees;
resisting merit pay provisions that could encourage employee productivity; and by
resisting technological or other changes that impact employment.[104] For
example, in the Indiana debate over teacher collective bargaining, Republicans
argued that seniority rules in collective agreements were inefficient because they
required schools to lay off meritorious younger teachers and retain less
meritorious senior teachers.[105] Furthermore, they argued that merit pay was
necessary to encourage increased teacher productivity.[106] As a result, the
legislature adopted, and Governor Mitch Daniels signed, a statute prohibiting
seniority provisions and requiring merit pay.[107] But these arguments ignore that
there are costs, as well and benefits to such provisions. Seniority provisions are
common in both the public and private sectors, even among unorganized
employers. This is because seniority provisions allow employers to make credible
promises to pay deferred wages that promote efficient monitoring and efficient
employee investment in human capital.[108] Without seniority provisions, future
school administrators will be tempted to meet short-run budgeting constraints by
reneging on long term implicit contracts and laying off senior workers, not because
they aren’t good employees, but merely because their wages are higher because
they include deferred compensation. While such opportunism may meet short
term budgeting demands, in the long-run it will discourage good teachers from
entering the profession. Although some use of merit pay may be useful, the idea of
merit pay was rejected by School Boards nation-wide in the 1950s, well before
teacher organization, because it was subject to racial and gender discrimination
and favoritism.[109] There are costs as well as benefits to administrative discretion
and it is not an easy question whether greater administrative control will increase
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or decrease public sector productivity. Whether restrictions on administrative
discretion decrease or increase public employee productivity and the efficiency of
their agencies is an empirical question.
Despite the difficulty of measuring productivity in service industries,[110] several
scholars have tried to measure the impact of unions on productivity in the public
sector. One of the few straightforward measures of productivity in services is the
mortality rate of heart attack patients in hospitals. In a 2004 study Michael Ash
and Jean Seago found that unionization in public hospitals led to significantly
lower mortality rates.[111] Consistent with this, in an earlier study Charles Register
found that unionization lead to increased productivity in public hospitals based on
more mundane measures of patient care.[112]
The effect of unionization on teacher productivity has been fairly extensively
studied, primarily using student test scores as the indicator of productivity. The
results have been mixed. In one of the earliest studies, Randall Eberts and Joe
Stone found that, after correcting for various factors, unionized public schools
enjoyed student test scores that were 3 percent higher overall, and 7 percent higher
for average students.[113] These positive results were first hotly contested by
Michael Kurth,[114] but then supported by later rework of the same data by
Howard Nelson and Jewell Gould.[115] In her 1996 study, Caroline Hoxby found
that teachers’ unions increased school budgets and improved the student-teacher
ratio, but had no positive impact on student test scores.[116] Both before and after
Hoxby, several studies found positive effects on teacher productivity from
unionization,[117] while others have found negative effects.[118] If any pattern
emerges from this collection of results, it seems to be that the unionization of
teachers increases the test scores of average students, but has little effect on the
test scores of the highest and lowest performers in schools, and may even hurt the
performance of low performing students.[119] It is also quite plausible that, as in
the private sector, the impact of unionization on productivity in the public sector
depends on the attitude of the parties. If management and the union are
recalcitrant and fight, productivity goes down, but if the parties negotiate and work
cooperatively, productivity can increase.[120]
V.

CONCLUSION

These have been contentious times in the long-running debate over the merits of
public sector collective bargaining. After several decades in which the question
seemed largely settled in favor of a system of collective consultation with recourse
to neutral mediation, fact-finding or arbitration (but largely without a right to
strike) at the state and federal level, the question has now been reopened in the
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debate over how to respond to the recent decline in private employment prospects
and government revenue. Although the detractors of public sector collective
bargaining have alleged that this institution has resulted in public sector wages and
benefits far out-pacing private sector compensation and significant inefficiencies
in government administration, neither of these claims seems warranted by the
existing empirical literature. When taking into account important differences
between the public and private sectors, including public employees’ higher
education levels than their private sector counterparts, recent empirical work
suggests that collective bargaining has allowed public employees to, at best, keep
pace with private sector compensation, although, predictably, public sector
employees take a larger share of their compensation in benefits. Similarly,
although there is much less good recent work on the subject, the existing empirical
research makes it clear that unions typically do not have substantial negative
effects on public employee productivity, and may even raise productivity in some
cases. Moreover there is evidence that public sector unions can have a beneficial
impact on the programs in which their members work in highlighting the benefits
of those programs and ensuring more adequate funding. Although the positive
view of public sector collective bargaining that previously prevailed in American
public policy is not always strictly true, it seems to much more closely track the
available empirical work than the older negative view that has since reemerged in
American state politics.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BY, STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD:
Karina Fruin, Daniel Quist, Ryan Thoma, and Daniel Zapata
Recent Developments is a regular feature of The Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
collective bargaining statutes.
I. IERLA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Accretion to an Existing Bargaining Unit

In Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399 and Western Illinois University,
Case No. 2011-CA-0106-C (IELRB 2012), the IELRB held that the University did
not refuse to bargain in good faith when it failed to apply the terms and conditions
of an existing collective bargaining agreements (CBA) to newly-added positions of
a bargaining unit.
The Union represented Western Illinois University employees that fall under the
title of Maintenance Worker since 1991. In January 2010, six University employees
in this classification approached the University and sought placement into the
higher-rated classification of Building Heat/Frost Insulator. In October 2010,
without notifying the Union, the University reclassified the six employees into this
higher-rated classification, and in effect promoted the employees out of the
bargaining unit. The University also made changes to the employees’ break
schedule and hourly wage.
The Union, rather than filing an unfair labor practice charge against the University
for unilaterally changing the terms of the six individuals’ employment, filed a
majority interest petition with the IELRB seeking to add the new Building
Heat/Frost Insulator position to the bargaining unit. The Board certified the new
classification into the bargaining unit on December 15, 2010.
The Union demanded that the University apply the terms of the existing CBA to
the new Building Heat/Frost Insulators. However, the University kept in place the
changes it had made to the employees’ wages and break schedule. On May 15, 2011,
the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the University under
sections 14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA, alleging that the University had failed
to bargain in good faith.
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The Board examined past IELRB decisions and analogous cases under the National
Labor Relations Act to conclude that the University had not violated the
Act. Citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Board noted that during
bargaining negotiations, an employer must maintain the status quo regarding
mandatory subjects of bargaining. If an employer fails to maintain the status quo
before a contractual agreement is reached, the employer breaches its duty to
bargain in good faith.
The IELRB cited Federal-Mogul Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 343 (1974), for the
proposition that applying the terms of an existing CBA to employees newlyaccreted to the bargaining unit would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding
in H.K. Porter Co., v. NLRB. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). In H.K. Porter, the Supreme Court
held that the NLRB could not require an employer or union to agree to substantive
provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Following this rationale
in the instant case, the IELRB reasoned that it could not compel the application of
the CBA to the newly-accreted Building Heat/Frost Insulators.
In sum, the IELRB held that “when employees are accreted to an existing
bargaining unit which has a collective bargaining agreement already in place,
unless that agreement provides otherwise, the employer and the union are
obligated to bargain regarding the newly-added employees’ terms and conditions
of employment.”
B.

Duty to Provide Information

In Chicago Board of Education and Service Employees International Union Local
73, Case No. 2011-CA-0088-C (IELRB 2012), the IELRB held that the Chicago
Board of Education violated sections 14(a)5) and (1) of the IELRA when it refused
to provide the union with two students’ discipline files. The union requested the
information for use in processing a grievance on behalf of a bargaining unit
member who had been discharged for alleged physical altercations with the
students. The union wanted the files to show the students’ pattern of violence and
inappropriate behavior, and to question the students’ credibility.
The Chicago Board of Education claimed the students’ records were protected
private information under the Illinois School Students’ Records Act and the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and it could not release the files without a
court order and parental notice. The Chicago Board of Education defended its
actions as necessary to maintain student privacy, claiming that this interest
outweighed the union’s need for the files. It claimed the union should have sought
a court order for release of the information, an alternative that would have
complied with the statutes.

FALL 2012

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

37

The IELRA reasoned that the union had an interest is receiving information
relevant to its performance of its functions as exclusive bargaining
representative. Relevancy was determined under a discovery standard, i.e.
whether it was likely to lead to information that might be admitted at an arbitration
hearing. An employer may object to disclosure in good faith based on privacy
concerns but the privacy exception is construed narrowly.
The IELRB determined that the Chicago board of Education had a legitimate
interest in keeping the information confidential, but noted that the union had
agreed to receive redacted files showing only the students’ first names. The IELRB
also noted that the files were only being released to the union, not to the general
public and concluded that the Chicago Board of Education failed to prove its
confidentiality defense.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
C.

Discrimination

In County of Cook v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 2012 IL App (1st) 111514, 976 N.E.2d
493 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2012) the First District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB
Local Panel’s ruling reinstating two employees with full backpay for an allegedly
discriminatory refusal to reinstate. The court held that the admission of testimony
regarding a statement made at a settlement conference was error and that the
statement, even if properly admitted was insufficient to prove Cook County acted
with antiunion animus in refusing to reinstate one of two terminated employees
during settlement negotiations.
The incidents giving rise to this case began in 2008, when background checks were
ordered on all employees and volunteers at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary
Detention Center (JDTC) pursuant to a federal court order. Following this order,
two nurses assigned to the JDTC, Beverly Joseph and Leslie Mitchner, were
discharged for gross insubordination when they each refused to authorize the
required background checks. Joseph and Mitchner grieved their terminations and
an arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Cook County, finding that the employer
had just cause to discharge the employees for insubordination.
Prior to arbitration, during settlement negotiations, a Cook County human
resources (HR) employee met offered to reinstate Joseph, but not Mitchner; the
union rejected the settlement offer. The union representative alleged that she
asked the HR employee if Cook County would not reinstate Mitchner because she
filed 14 or 15 grievances in a single day. The human resources representative
responded, “yes.”
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An ALJ found that Cook County was motivated by antiunion animus when it
initially terminated Joseph and Mitchner and when the employer refused to offer
reinstatement to both nurses during settlement negotiations. The Local Panel
rejected the ALJ’s recommended decision that both nurses were initially fired for
anti-union animus. However, two members of the Panel concurred with the ALJ
that both employees were not reinstated at the settlement conference due to
antiunion animus. The third-member of the Panel dissented. The ILRB ruled both
employees should be reinstated with full backpay and benefits, contingent on the
employees authorizing and passing the required background checks. Cook County
appealed the Board’s split decision.
The Appellate Court began its analysis by noting that the ILRB’s decision to
reinstate both employees necessarily voided the arbitrator’s decision that the
employees were terminated for just cause, which the Board and courts alike are
bound to uphold. However, Cook County first raised the argument that the Board
lacked the ability to reinstate the employees in its reply brief. As a result, the
employer waived this argument and the court refused to consider it.
The court observed that a party alleging a discriminatory discharge before the
ILRB has the burden to establish four elements: (1) the employee is engaged in
protected union activity; (2) the employer had knowledge of the protected activity;
(3) the employer took an adverse employment action against the employee; and
(4) the employer’s action was motivated by the employer’s animus towards the
employee’s protected union activity. The court noted that there was no dispute
between the parties that the employees engaged in union activities or that the
employer had knowledge of these actions. While Cook County conceded that the
employees’ initial terminations were adverse employment actions, but both parties
failed to address whether failure to reinstate the nurses during settlement
negotiations also constituted an adverse employment action.
The court refused to rule on whether the employer actually committed an adverse
employment action in this case because the parties had not argued it. The court
proceeded with its analysis of the issues assuming there was an adverse
employment action, because there could not be a violation of sections 10(a)(1) or
(a)(2) otherwise.
The Court reversed the reinstatement of the two employees for failure of
admissible proof that an unfair labor practice had occurred. The Illinois
Administrative Code requires that the rules of evidence and privilege as applied in
civil cases in circuit courts of Illinois be followed in administrative
hearings. However, Section 11(a) of the IPLRA states that in Board hearings all

FALL 2012

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

39

parties are only bound by the rules of privilege recognized by law. Despite this
language, the ILRB’s own rules provide that “the Administrative Law Judge will,
insofar as practicable, apply the rules of evidence applicable in Illinois Courts.” Ill.
Adm. Code 1200.130 (2012). The court found the Board’s own rules are controlling
and, therefore, both the ALJ and the Board should have applied the rules of
evidence applicable in Illinois courts but failed to do so.
As a general matter, Illinois courts do not admit matters concerning settlement
negotiations because admitting such evidence would have a chilling effect on
settlement negotiations and negotiations during settlement do not constitute
admissions of guilt. Illinois courts have long applied Federal Rule of Evidence
(FRE) 408, which severely limits the admissibility of statements made during
settlement negotiations. Further, the ILRB’s own policy provided identical
protection to statements made during settlement negotiations as provided for in
FRE 408 under 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1200.120 (2010).
Under FRE 408, statements made during settlement negotiations are prohibited
from being admitted as proof for the validity of the claim. As a result, the HR
employee’s statement cannot be admitted as proof of the alleged unfair labor
practice. The HR employee who allegedly made the statement during negations
also did not testify as a witness before the ILRB and therefore could not qualify
under any exception embodied in FRE 408(b). The court to conclude that the HR
employee’s statement during the settlement negotiations was inadmissible under
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ILRB’s own rules.
The court continued that even if the HR employee’s statement was admissible, it
alone was an insufficient basis for establishing the employer’s liability. First, any
animus exhibited by the HR employee was irrelevant, because he had no decisionmaking authority. It was undisputed that the Director was the sole decision-maker
regarding the determination to initially discharge the employees and the decision
not to offer reinstatement to both nurses. The statement made by the HR employee
during settlement negotiations did not relate to whether the Director acted out of
anti-union animus. There was no evidence showing that the Director spoke with
the HR employee before the negotiations or any evidence that the Director was in
any way motivated by animus. Further, both nurses engaged in exactly the same
protected activities, the filing of multiple grievances, but no evidence accounted
for why Cook County was willing to offer reinstatement only to Joseph.
As a result, the Court concluded even if the statement made during settlement
negotiations was admissible, it was an abuse of the Board’s discretion to establish
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Cook County’s liability for the unfair labor practice charge based on this statement
alone.
D.

School District Peace Officers

In Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of
Support Staff, 972 N.E.2d 1254 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2012), the Fourth District
Appellate Court held that the Peoria School District may proceed in Circuit Court
on its complaint that Public Act 96-1257 violated the state constitutional
prohibition against special legislation. Public Act 96- 1257 amended the IPLRA to
include within its coverage “peace officers employed by a school district in its own
police department in existence of the effective date” of the act. Peoria was the only
school district that employed its own police force.
The relevant effect of PA No. 96-1257 on labor relations concerns employees’ right
to strike. Generally, both the IPLRA and IELRA permit employees to strike when
collective bargaining breaks down. However, the IPLRA precludes public
employees employed as security personnel, peace officers, or firefighters from
striking and instead provides for interest arbitration between them and their
employers.
The Peoria School District maintained that PA No. 96-1257 violated the state
constitutional prohibition against special legislation, which prohibits the
legislature from making classifications that arbitrarily discriminate in favor of a
select group. The court found no fundamental right or suspect class was affected
by PA No. 96-1257 and, thus, applied the “deferential rational basis test.” In
applying this test, the court found that the complaint alleged facts that, if proved,
would show that PA No. 96-1257 arbitrarily discriminates in favor of a select
group. Specifically, the court found the following to be relevant distinctions made
by PA No. 96-1257: (1) between peace officers employed by plaintiff and any peace
officers who may be employed directly by other school districts in the future; and
(2) between plaintiff and any school district that, in the future, may employ peace
officers directly.
Despite agreeing that the state has a legitimate interest in treating all police officers
similarly, with respect to the right to strike, the court held that Peoria raised a
legitimate concern that the statutory distinctions are not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. The court found that the act could not rationally account
for the identified distinctions between (1) the statute’s treatment of officers
currently employed by school districts and those who may be employed by other
school districts in the future and (2) its corresponding treatment of the school
districts employing such officers.
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In essence, the understood took the language of PA No. 96-1257 to mean that that
any officers directly employed by school districts other than the plaintiff in the
future would remain under the purview of the IELRA, not the IPLRA. Thus, those
future officers would be allowed to strike but not to go into interest
arbitration. The court noted that if the state’s legitimate objective was to ensure
that police officers, no matter who employs them, are not allowed to strike, then
the distinction between police employees of school districts currently employing
police officers and those of school districts that may employee police in the future
is irrational. Hence, the court found that PA No. 96-1257 did not further a
legitimate state interest and that the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to make
out a claim that the amended Public Labor Relations Act constituted special
legislation.

